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Patron privacy, as articulated in the American Library Association (ALA) Code of Ethics, is a 
longstanding concern for librarians.  In online environments, the possibility of tracking by third 
parties, usage of HTTPS/TLS to provide secure connections, and easy disclosure of a site’s privacy 
policies all have implications for user privacy.  This paper presents new empirical evidence about 
these issues and discusses their ethical implications.  Data about the incidence of third-party 
tracking, usage of HTTPS by default, and easy discoverability of a privacy policy or terms of 
service (TOS) were collected for public libraries across Canada and the United States.  The sample 
consisted of 178 public libraries; members of the Canadian Urban Libraries Council and Urban 
Libraries Council.  Several common commercial databases (e.g. OverDrive) were also examined 
using the same criteria.  Results show that only 12% of libraries were devoid of third-party 
tracking, with Google Analytics being the most common third-party tracker.  While libraries may 
support HTTPS under certain circumstances, it was found that a majority of libraries serve neither 
their websites nor their online catalogs (OPACs) HTTPS by default.  Regarding disclosure of 
possible tracking, it was found that 58% of libraries did not link to a TOS or privacy policy from 
their homepage.  Together with previous research on the usage of privacy-enhancing tools in public 
libraries, these results suggest that public libraries are accessories to third-party tracking on a large 
scale.  Implications of this fact in light of library professional ethics are discussed.   















Introduction   
On June 24th, 2019, a Civil Grand July in Santa Cruz County California issued a report rebuking 
the Santa Cruz Public Libraries for: failing to inform patrons how their personal data was used, 
not adopting best practices for privacy outlined by the American Library Association, and for 
entering into contracts with third parties that raised liability issues related to patron privacy – 
among other things (York 2019). To what extent are other libraries at risk for reprimand? How 
are we protecting patron privacy? In the sea of libraries any particular institution is after all but 
one drop, and a library can preserve privacy only when it acts correctly with policies and 
disclosures its users are conscious of. Unless sufficient numbers of libraries take the lead on 
tracking disclosure, the rhetoric of privacy they employ rings hollow. Perceptive patrons will see 
through the facade, librarians will know they are failing to uphold their professional ethics and 
best practices; the whole advocacy effort on behalf of privacy could be called into question. 
Privacy is a complex multi-faceted issue made all the more complicated when the medium over 
which users are desiring privacy and which libraries offer their services is the internet. Currently, 
the internet more closely resembles a Benthamite panopticon more than the liberatory frontier 
imagined by John Perry Barlow (Assange 2014; Mozilla 2017).  
This paper considers two aspects of online privacy: secure connections between users and the 
library content they seek, and the often invisible, web of third-parties tracking user behavior on 
websites. Though secure connections between users and library content is arguably more 
important, third-party tracking strikes at the philosophical heart of any meaningful conception 
and operationalization of privacy. There can be no real and effective “privacy” in a library that 
surreptitiously allows third-parties access to their digital environments while library patrons use 
these websites in ignorance of the fact that a handful of publishing and services firms are privy to 
their usage. 
Literature Review   
Professional Ethics 
Librarians and their professional associations have a storied and noble history of advocacy on 
behalf of user privacy (Ard 2016). Indeed, Jason Griffey has suggested that in an online world of 
ubiquitous tracking, “the main service that public libraries might provide in the future is privacy” 
(Griffey 2016).    
Moving from the various methods that librarians might structure the digital environments of their 
users for more passive privacy, there is also the question of proactively educating patrons. That 
efforts to educate the public about the importance of privacy are justified has been suggested by 
many individuals and notably since 2010 has been embodied in the American Library 
Association’s annual “Choose Privacy Week”. Some libraries make a stronger claim though, that 
not only is such education justified but necessary (Lamdan 2015; Morrone 2015). Such an 
attitude has been most publicly proclaimed by people associated with the Library Freedom 
Project which offers clear and comprehensive steps for users to take and shares their educational 
materials.   




To take the pulse of how public libraries in Canada and the United States were approaching 
computing privacy and security in light of our professional ethics, this paper studies elements of 
those issues using library websites.   
 Third-Party Tracking 
Third-party tracking, sometimes called “leaking”, is an ubiquitous aspect of the modern internet 
(Englehardt and Narayanan 2016; Acar et al. 2014). Third-party tracking on the world wide web 
has been documented as far back as 1996 and since then has been increasing in complexity, the 
number of elements tracked as well as the number of methods of tracking, and prevalence 
unabated (Lerner et al. 2016). Common methods include: standard HTTP browser cookies (in 
same-site and third-party variety), Adobe Flash cookies (less of a threat with the gradual 
disappearance of Flash), local storage so-called “supercookies” and ETags, the Evercookie 
(which uses redundant multiple methods in order to make it difficult to delete), and JavaScript 
fingerprinting.  
Some tracking mechanisms are used by law enforcement and other state entities (Albrecht and 
McIntyre 2014; Rankin 2014; Tate and Soltani 2014; Zetter 2014). But by and large, third-party 
tracking is used for commercial purposes, specifically targeted advertising (Hoofnagle et al. 
2012; Cranor 2012). Of these tracking methods, JavaScript fingerprinting is perhaps the most 
pernicious because it allows identification of individual users with a very high degree of 
confidence both based on their device and also based on their behavior; the only way to avoid 
such fingerprinting for certain is to disable JavaScript which renders most websites non-
functional (Acar et al. 2014).  Furthermore, the widespread incidence of third-party tracking has 
been known for decades, even in the popular press (Madrigal 2012; Sullivan 2012).  
In 2016, Eric Hellman looked at the websites of 123 Association of Research Libraries (ARL) 
member institutions. Using the Ghostery plugin for Chrome, what he found was not 
encouraging.1 Google Analytics was used by 72% of ARL Libraries; 28% used Amazon to 
enrich their catalogs, thus transmitting query data via referrer headers. Web beacons, allowing 
(potential identifiable) individual tracking, were found on 13% of ARL catalog pages (Hellman 
2016). Cody Hanson, in a study of 15 commercial publisher websites along the lines of that 
undertaken below in this study, found four publisher platforms with Facebook code, four 
platforms with Neustar (a marketing firm) code, six with Adobe code, four with Oracle 
Marketing Cloud code, 11 with AddThis (a social sharing button that cooperates with 
commercial data brokers), and 14 with Google code. In each case, such code allows the 
aforementioned parties to surreptitiously gather information about user behavior and possibly 
link library activity with pre-existing data profiles about users; he concluded: “I do not believe it 
is possible for use of licensed resources to be private” (Hanson 2019). Empirical work on the 
amount of third party tracking in library settings is largely lacking, something the present paper 
begins to rectify.   
The possibilities for user tracking and profiling and the methods already extant and in use are 
astounding (Privacy International 2018). A growing and already robust market in consumer data 
 
1 This present study uses a very similar methodology to Hellman, 2016.  I thank Myron Groover for bringing Hellman’s 
blog post to my attention, as well as any number of the articles reviewed for this literature review.  




has existed for decades. With the advent of big data as captured via web browsers and harvested 
from smartphones the existing streams of consumer demographic and purchase data can now be 
merged with online behavioral analytics data to create detailed pictures of individuals – without 
their knowledge – to which optimization logic is indiscriminately applied for various commercial 
ends (Esposti 2014). There is debate in the literature as to the richness of the probabilistic 
pictures that can be painted using big data; they have improved over time as machine learning 
algorithms have improved. Though one thing is certain, when demographic and commercial data 
is combined with social network information, the predictions made about people become 
stronger (Huey et al. 2012).  
Of particular interest given the sample in this study is work done by Smith and Lyon in 2013 
documenting views on surveillance and privacy among Canadian and United States samples. 
Both countries experienced about a 10 percent drop from 2006 to 2012 among people reporting 
they were knowledgeable about laws dealing with the protection of personal information from 
private companies. Across the same period, opinions about employers sharing employee 
information with third parties remained stable, with most respondents opposed; age differences 
were pronounced on this question with older respondents being much more opposed and those 18 
to 34 only 35% opposed, suggesting that privacy advocacy has an uphill climb in the future 
among the young (Smith and Lyon 2013). 
 Library Website Security 
Apart from privacy, how secure are library websites? How secure are their catalogs? The usage 
of Transport Layer Security which is used to verify the authenticity of websites, HTTP traffic, 
and keep user communications and web browsing safe from packet-sniffing and packet-injection, 
is the commercial and technical standard (“HTTPS” 2020). Alison Macrina, founder of the 
Library Freedom Project, explained the implications of using HTTPS on library websites. 
Libraries would never allow interlopers to stand near a circulation desk and record who checked 
out what, or allow for patrons to be followed as they navigate the stacks, yet by serving their 
websites and catalogs in unsecured HTTP, they allow for digital occurrences of a similar nature 
(Macrina 2015). The public image of libraries as essential democratic institutions and the trust 
they have earned demand the use of secure online platforms. In the context of higher education, 
Hellman noted only a few years ago that a paltry 20% of ARL Libraries secured their catalogs 
with TLS/SSL by default (Hellman, Eric 2016). Others have noted that the failure to use HTTPS 
with Breeding noting that only 13% of ARL library websites defaulted to HTTPS and that of 25 
large public libraries he sampled, only two used HTTPS on their website and seven in their 
catalogs (Breeding 2016). 
In addition to securing their online platforms using HTTPS, there are a variety of actions 
libraries can take to protect the privacy of users on library property. In communities all across 
the world, there are some people who primarily obtain internet access by visiting their local 
library and using computers provided there. Several authors have suggested that merely 
supplying access is not sufficient and that libraries need to configure their public access 
computers to provide users with a level of privacy and security above that which comes out of 
the box or just with programs such as Deep Freeze.2 Eric Phetteplace suggested not only 
 
2 http://www.faronics.com/products/deep-freeze  




common sense basics such as having all browsers set to never remember passwords and to load 
into “private” (called “incognito” in Chrome) mode, but also the installation of extensions 
designed to “harden” out of the box browser security. These included: HTTPS Everywhere, Web 
of Trust, NoScript, and the adblocker AdBlock+ (Phetteplace 2012). Such extensions would 
improve security for users, offer a modicum of protection against malicious sites, make potential 
attacks opt-in, and improve page load times by limiting some advertising and third-party 
tracking.  
It has also been suggested that an additional step libraries might take is to default to privacy-
preserving search engines, e.g. DuckDuckGo, on public computers and for libraries to promote 
their use (Radical Reference 2014; Gardner 2013; Phetteplace 2012). In order to provide some 
empirical context for library privacy and security efforts, Gardner & Groover surveyed 69 
libraries in Canada and the United States, all of which fall into the sample of the present study. 
They found that most responding libraries failed to use the private browsing on their public 
terminals by default; nor did a majority have any ad-blocking software installed on those 
terminals (Gardner and Groover 2015). Most of the surveyed libraries defaulted to Google for 
search purposes; only 25% of responding libraries said they had offered public instruction in 
online anonymity or privacy. Those results stand in agreement to work done by Zimmer which 
surveyed 1,214 librarians and in which 76% said “libraries are doing all they can to prevent 
unauthorized access to individual’s personal information”. But that same survey found that only 
13% responded that their libraries have offered privacy-related events for the general public 
(Zimmer 2014). All of this begs the question of how librarians understand “all they can” since 
privacy training is not ubiquitous nor is use and endorsement of tools to “harden” web browsers. 
These technical and empirical discussions aside, others have pointed out the ethical questions 
raised by systemic power imbalances between upstream commercial firms that supply so much 




This study examined the websites of 178 public libraries in North America: 45 from 
Canada, and 133 from the United States. These libraries were purposely selected for their 
membership in either the Canadian Urban Libraries Council (CULC) or the Urban Libraries 
Council (ULC) in the United States.3 These organizations have some of the largest library systems 
in their membership and serve the urban and suburban communities in both countries. The 
Canadian sample libraries were located in communities that account for approximately 41% of 
Canada’s population.4 United States sample libraries were located in communities that account for 
 
3 Membership in the Urban Libraries Council changes periodically as institutions join or withdraw. For a listing of 
the institutions examined, see the raw data underlying this study on figshare: 
https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12219863.v1  
4 Canadian population figures were obtained for every municipal library system in the CULC; libraries serving wide 
geographies i.e. “regional” systems were excluded. The data was obtained from the Statistics Canada website 
reporting out the results of the 2016 Census.  




approximately 28% of the United States of America’s population.5 These percentage figures serve 
as hypothetical, upper bound estimates of the population affected by third-party tracking since not 
every member of these communities actually uses their local public library.    
Common Content Sources  
In addition to evaluating public library websites, 10 common content sources that many 
public libraries subscribe to were also examined to measure how many of these facilitated third-
party tracking. These content sources were selected for their wide usage and the nature of the 
information they provide, which is commonly known to be in demand among public library users. 
The common content sources included the following: 
• Ancestry.com, a popular source for genealogical information;  
• Chilton Auto Repair Manuals, which are the leading source for automotive repair 
information and are widely used in do-it-yourself and professional settings;  
• Consumer Reports, a well-respected and widely used source for unbiased product 
reviews and ratings;   
• hoopla, an online streaming media service offering music, movies, television 
shows, and ebooks;  
• Lynda, an online education source offering multi-topic video courses;6  
• Mango Languages, an online language and culture learning suite offering videos 
and applications to instruct users in scores of languages;  
• NoveList, the industry standard source of reading recommendations and book 
reviews;  
• OneClickDigital, a leading provider of downloadable audiobooks and ebooks;  
• OverDrive, a distributor of ebooks, audiobooks, music, and videos, to which 
thousands of libraries around the world subscribe; and  
• zinio, an online distributor of digital copies of magazines.   
Measures 
Data on third-party tracking was collected using two web browser add-ons: Ghostery and 
Disconnect. These add-ons were chosen for this analysis due to their widespread usage among the 
general public and the fact that they have been used successfully in previous research on third-
party tracking (Schaub et al. 2016; Mathur et al. 2018). Ghostery is used by “more than seven 
million” users and Disconnect by “tens of millions of people” (Ghostery n.d.; Disconnect n.d.). 
Typically, third-party tracking is done using JavaScript code, often called tags or scripts, to create 
cookies or super-cookies, which record the pages a user visits over a specified time period. This 
allows the third-parties to build profiles on users based on their browsing behavior; information 
leakage, referred to above, takes place via HTTP Referrer headers. Both Ghostery and Disconnect 
 
5 United States population figures were obtained for every municipal or county library system in the ULC. The data 
was obtained from the American Factfinder website reporting out the results of the 2015 American Community 
Survey 5-year population estimates. When applicable, municipal library systems were excluded to avoid double 
counting in the USA figures if a County system was also a member of ULC; e.g. Los Angeles (Los Angeles Public 
Library) and Los Angeles County (County of Los Angeles Public Library).  
6 Now known as LinkedIn Learning.  




work by examining the JavaScript code on web pages. Dissimilarities between the two add-ons 
and discrepancies between their counts for the same pages occasionally occurred; these matters 
are addressed in the Appendix. The counts for each are reported separately in the results below.   
More specifically, Ghostery detects and blocks trackers and reports them in a findings 
window, which appears when the Ghostery icon in the browser bar is clicked (see Figure 1). This 
window reports the total number of trackers and also evaluates them qualitatively based on 
information it collects in order to classify them according to 8 mutually exclusive categories: 
Advertising, Comments, Customer Interaction, Essential, Pornvertising, Site Analytics, Social 
Media, and Audio/Video Player.  
Figure 1: Ghostery 
 




Similarly, Disconnect detects and blocks trackers and reports them in a findings window, 
which appears when the Disconnect icon in the browser bar is clicked (see Figure 2). The total 
number of trackers is visible in the Disconnect icon of the browser bar, the window displaying a 
qualitative analysis of each tracker, which is based on information Disconnect collects. Trackers 
are classified according to 7 mutually exclusive categories: Facebook, Google, Twitter, 
Advertising, Analytics, Social, and Content.   
Figure 2: Disconnect 
 
Additionally, in order to determine whether public libraries and common content sources 
informed their users of any third-party tracking, searches were performed (using Ctrl-F) to find the 
presence of a link on each library or source’s homepage that might lead to such information. A 
simplistic measure of informing or not informing users was developed based on whether the 
homepage of a library or common content source had a linked policy statement. Some typical 
examples of text used to link such polices are “Privacy Policy,” “Privacy Statement,” “Terms of 
Service,” “Terms of Use,” and “Website Policies.” Data were collected by visiting the homepage 




for each library and each common content source and searching for any of the proceeding words: 
“privacy”, “terms”, “policy”, or “policies.” (Note: for French-language libraries in Canada, the 
words “conditions”, “confidentialité”, and “règle” were searched.) If any of the words were found 
to be a link to some relevant policy, they were counted as informing their users; if the words were 
not found as links to such a relevant policy, the sample member was recorded as non-informing. 
Qualitative analysis of the linked policies, such as determining whether they accurately disclosed 
the extent of any third-party tracking, was not done. Subpages for each sample library were not 
examined; they were only counted as informing if a link to a statement or disclaimer was on the 
main homepage or landing page.7  
Data Acquisition Procedure 
All tracking data from Ghostery and Disconnect data were collected using Firefox ESR 
version 38.8.0., Ghostery tracking figures were collected using Ghostery (for Mozilla Firefox) 
version 6.2.0; Disconnect tracking figures were collected using Disconnect (for Mozilla Firefox) 
version 3.15.3.1.8 Data on public libraries was obtained by visiting an online public access catalog 
(OPAC) search results page for each library. This was first done in Ghostery, which was then 
removed and replaced with Disconnect; Disconnect data was collected by visiting the same search 
results page again. Data on common content sources was obtained in a similar manner; however, 
links from the author’s respective public libraries were followed to each source.9 This was a 
necessary step due to the fact that many public libraries require authentication with a proxy server 
using library-provided credentials in order to reach the landing homepage of the content sources 
that they subscribe to. No other Firefox extensions were installed during data collection. The type, 
i.e. brand or product, of each OPAC was also recorded for each library; this data was obtained via 
libraries.org, an international directory maintained by Marshall Breeding. The data collection 
period ran for three months, from March 2017 through May 2017. Data on potential disclosure of 
tracking was collected during the same period using the method previously detailed above. 
Whether CULC and ULC library homepages and their corresponding landing pages of the OPAC 
were served HTTPS by default was also recorded. 
Results 
Third-Party Tracking Incidence   
Public Libraries 
It was commonplace for libraries in the sample to facilitate third-party tracking. The results 
from Ghostery and Disconnect were similar as far as the total number of libraries including third-
 
7 See the Limitations section for the implications of this.  
8 Firefox was used simply because it was easiest to deploy in a vanilla (out of the box) fashion on the researcher’s 
computer. Various web browsers do perform differently regarding their treatment of mixed HTTP/HTTPS content 
and some have built-in protections against third-party trackers. However the object of this study was simply to 
record incidence of tracking, not compare the relative merits of browsers; Firefox was sufficient for that purpose.  
9 Ghostery and Disconnect counts were measured for these sources when accessed via a Canadian public library which 
had access to some of them and via a public library in the United States which had access to some of them. No intra-
Ghostery or intra-Disconnect discrepancies were observed between tracker counts based on geography.  




party tracking in their online catalogs: Ghostery recorded 154 libraries enabling third-party 
tracking while Disconnect recorded 156. There were two instances where Disconnect detected 
third-party tracking but Ghostery did not; for the 22 libraries (12%) where Disconnect did not 
detect tracking, Ghostery obtained the same results. In other words, the majority of libraries in the 
sample allowed some type of third-party tracking of their users. Disconnect, in general, recorded 
more trackers than Ghostery for the same URLs. Table 1, below, shows the total counts and other 
measures for Ghostery and Disconnect in their examinations of library online catalogs.  
Table 1 
Table 1  
Incidence of 3rd-Party Tracking in Public Library Catalogs 
n=178 
Measures Ghostery Disconnect 
Number of Libraries Enabling 
3rd-Party Tracking 
154 156 
Total Number of Trackers 
Detected 
269 362 
Number of Trackers per 
Library: Average 
1.51 2.03 
Number of Trackers per 
Library: Median 
1 2 




Of libraries that allowed tracking, the incidence was similar across the United States and Canada. 
Of Canadian libraries in the sample, 89% (40) enabled third-party tracking; for libraries in the 
United States, 87% (116) did. (Note that the 87% figure was derived from the Disconnect total 
tracking count, which detected two more deployments of tracking than Ghostery.) The number of 
trackers detected by Ghostery and Disconnect for Canadian libraries is shown in Figure 3. Figure 












Figure 3: Canadian Libraries – 3rd-Party Tracker Prevalence 
 
 
Figure 4: United States Libraries – 3rd-Party Tracker Prevalence 
 
 
The various categories that Disconnect and Ghostery used to classify trackers allowed for 
a slightly more granular analysis. Disconnect tallied tracker counts for Google, Facebook, and 
Twitter and displayed them in the viewing window noted above. Facebook tracking was found by 
Disconnect in 40 libraries: 18 of which were in Canada, the remaining 22 in the United States. 
Google tracking, including Google Analytics or Google Tag Manager (or both), was found by 
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3rd-Party Tracker Prevalency in United States Libraries
n=133
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libraries were found to have any third-party tracking from Twitter. Other trackers detected by 
Disconnect were Crazy Egg (36), New Relic (3), AddThis (3), ShareThis (1), Optimizely (1), and 
Zopim (1). Crazy Egg offers heatmaps, scrollmaps, click reports, and other features. New Relic 
offers data ingestion, storage, and visualization features along with frontend performance 
monitoring. AddThis is a social bookmarking service that allows users to share an item with 
popular social media platforms; ShareThis is a similar tracker. Optimizely is an A/B testing tool. 
Zopim (now called Zendesk Chat) is a live chat tool. Tracking entity as determined by Disconnect 
is displayed below for Canadian libraries in Figure 5. The same measures for the United States 
libraries are below in Figure 6.  
Figure 5: Tracking in Canadian Libraries as Measured by Disconnect 
 











































Tracking in United States Libraries - Measured by 
Disconnect
n=133




Ghostery similarly tallied tracker counts for its 8 categories of Advertising, Comments, 
Customer Interaction, Essential, Pornvertising, Site Analytics, Social Media, and Audio/Video 
Player. Facebook tracking, categorized under Social Media, was found by Ghostery in 39 libraries, 
18 of which were in Canada, the other 21 in the United States. Google tracking, including Google 
Analytics or Google Tag Manager (or both), was found by Ghostery in 154 libraries: 40 Canadian, 
114 in the United States. Other trackers detected by Ghostery included Crazy Egg (35), New Relic 
(9), DoubleClick (6), AddThis (4), ShareThis(1), Optimizely (1), HotJar (1), Loop11 (1), Zopim 
(1), SumOfMe (1), Piwik (1), and Adobe Typekit (4).10 Tracker type as determined by Ghostery 
is displayed below for Canadian libraries in Figure 7. The same measures for the United States 
libraries are below in Figure 8. 









10 There is debate about whether Adobe Typekit is actually “tracking”. Adobe states that Typekit does not set any 

























Tracking in Canadian Libraries - Measured by Ghostery
n=45




Figure 8: Tracking in United States Libraries as Measured by Ghostery 
 
Certain OPACS were associated with higher tracking counts. A majority of the libraries 
sampled (69%) used only 4 catalogs; the most used OPACs in the sample were Bibliocommons 
(37), Encore (32), Enterprise (27), and Polaris (27). The remaining 31% of the sample used 20 
different catalogs between them. Bibliocommons, Enterprise, and Polaris usually had more 
trackers than other catalogs; it is unclear whether these 3 catalogs have more trackers enabled by 
default or whether their consistent association with higher tracker counts is a spurious relationship. 
Averages and medians were calculated for each catalog type that was represented more than once 
using the highest Ghostery or Disconnect counts. Nine catalogs appeared only once, providing 
insufficient data about which to generalize. Among libraries in the sample, the average number of 
trackers on Bibliocommons search results pages was 3.14; the average on Encore pages was 1.19; 
the average on Enterprise pages was 2.93, and the average on Polaris pages was 2.59. Tracker 
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Figure 9: Number of 3rd-Party Trackers per Online Public Access Catalog 
 
Common Content Sources 
The presence of third-party tracking was common among the 10 common content sources 
examined. Only two sources, Chilton Auto Repair Manuals and NoveList did not contain third-
party trackers. Among the remaining 8, there were some wide discrepancies between the total 
number of trackers recorded by Disconnect and the trackers recorded by Ghostery for the same 
































Number of 3rd-Party Trackers per OPAC
n=169
Number of Trackers: Median Number of Trackers: Average






Incidence of 3rd-Party Tracking in Common Content Sources 
n=10 
Common Content Source Ghostery Total Tracker 
Count 
Disconnect Total Tracker 
Count 
Ancestry 3 11 
Chilton 0 0 
Consumer Reports 4 11 
hoopla 4 3 
Lynda 3 13 
Mango Languages 3 1 
NoveList 0 0 
OneClickDigital 2 2 
OverDrive 4 3 
Zinio 3 2 
Using the tracker categories delineated by Ghostery and Disconnect, the specific types of 
tracking enabled by these common content sources was apparent. Ghostery recorded 4 sources as 
allowing tracking by Facebook: Ancestry, hoopla, Lynda, and zinio. Disconnect recorded 3 
sources as allowing Facebook tracking: Ancestry, hoopla, and Lynda. Both Ghostery and 
Disconnect recorded the same number of sources, 6, using Google Analytics: Consumer Reports, 
hoopla, Lynda, Mango Languages, OneClickDigital, and OverDrive. Some sites used additional 
analytics trackers, which included Optimizely, Inspectlet, webtrends, and New Relic.  
Disclosure of Tracking   
Libraries did not inform their users about third-party trackers at the same rate as tracking 
occurred. Fewer libraries were counted as potentially informing their users about third-party 
tracking than those that did potentially inform. Note that the potential of informing users is what 
was measured, not whether any linked policy statements or terms of service accurately disclosed 
the level of tracking. Of sample libraries in Canada, 25 presented a link on their homepage to some 
type of privacy statement or terms of service while 20 did not. Of sample libraries in the United 
States, 50 presented a link on their homepage to some type of privacy statement or terms of service 
while 83 did not. All 10 common content sources examined had links on their landing page leading 
to either a Privacy Statement or a Terms of Service statement. Figure 10 shows the percentages of 
CULC and ULC member libraries that link to a privacy or terms statement from their homepage.   
 
 




Figure 10: Prevalence of a Link to a Privacy or Terms Statement From a Library's 
Homepage 
 
For the 156 libraries in the sample that included third-party tracking scripts in their online 
catalogs, 69 (44%) included a link on their homepage potentially informing users of the presence 
of third-party tracking. (Above, it was reported that Ghostery counted only 154 libraries with third-
party tracking; it is assumed for this portion of the analysis that Disconnect’s detection of trackers 
in two additional libraries was accurate.) Thus, a majority of libraries allowing third-party tracking, 
87 (56%), did not potentially inform their users about this tracking via an easily recognizable link 
on their homepage. Table 3 below displays the counts of third-party tracking and the counts of 
links to privacy or terms language for libraries in the sample. As described prior, eight of the 10 
common content sources allowed third-party tracking; all 10 had a linked privacy or terms of 
service statement on their landing pages.   
Table 3 
Table 3 





3rd-Party Tracking No 3rd-Party Tracking 
Link to Privacy or 
Terms Statement  
69 6 









Does the Library Link Users to a Privacy or Terms 
Statement on the Homepage?
n=178
Linked Statement - United States
Linked Statement - Canada
No Linked Statement - Canada
No Linked Statement - United
States




HTTPS Usage by Default 
Relatively few libraries are taking advantage of the security offered by HTTPS and 
continue to transmit their websites and catalogs to users over HTTP by default. In general, catalogs 
are more often served HTTPS, with 49% of Canadian libraries and 29% of United States libraries 
deploying their catalogs with the security offered by transport layer security (TLS). The number 
of libraries recorded using HTTPS by default for both their website and catalog was very small, 
just 2 Canadian libraries and 4 United States libraries offered this level of security to their patrons. 
One important point to stress here is that these results are only measures of the default behavior, 
i.e. when visiting a website with http:// in the URL in a vanilla browser, is it served up to the user 
in HTTP or in HTTPS? Libraries may offer HTTPS if the user adjusts the URL or is using a 
browser plugin such as HTTPS Everywhere; however if HTTP remains the default, many users 
will experience insecure connections. Results on HTTPS usage, broken down by country, are 
displayed in Table 4.  
Table 4 
Table 4 
Default Usage of HTTPS When Visiting a Library Homepage and Searching Their Catalog 
Location Homepage HTTPS OPAC HTTPS Both Homepage 




Canada n=45 4 (8.9%) 22 (48.9%) 2 (4.4%) 21 (46.7%) 
United States n=133 10 (7.5%) 38 (28.6%) 4 (3.0%) 89 (66.9%) 
Note: Percentages are calculated relative to each country, not to the total sample size. Row totals do not sum to the sample size of 
each country because the ‘Both Homepage & OPAC HTTPS’ column double counts libraries also listed in the first two columns.  
 
Discussion 
Clearly, the results of this study demonstrate a gap between stated ethical theory and actual 
practice. Smith and Lyon have shown that despite their different political cultures, the 
similarities in how people in Canada and the United States experience surveillance are more 
salient than their differences (Smith and Lyon 2013). Given that, we might expect to see only 
minimal discrepancies between the prevalence of third-party tracking, the usage of HTTPS, and 
the accessibility of web privacy polices in their libraries. That is indeed what was found, though 
no tests of statistical significance are performed because those would not be relevant to the 
research question in this study, we see that Canada and the United States follow similar patterns 
and proportions along the various measures collected. Libraries in both countries typically have 
one to three third-party trackers in their web presence. The categories, defined by Disconnect, of 
“Google”, followed by “Facebook” in a distant second, followed by “Other” were proportionally 
the same in both countries. The Ghostery classification found similar results indicating that of 
those libraries enabling third-party tracking, most are doing so for internal site analytics reasons 
by way of Google Analytics and Google Tag Manager. Unfortunately, a small minority of 




libraries in both countries appear to enabling third-party tracking by Facebook on at least some 
portion of their web presence. In both countries, those lacking a link to a privacy or terms 
statement from a library's homepage were a minority.  
An underappreciated aspect of recent development over the past decade or so is the rise of e-
scores. Indeed, they’ve been dubbed “the new face of predictive analytics” by the American 
Marketing Association (Soat 2013). Cathy O’Neil  has chronicled the various ways that e-scores 
are used; they can affect credit decisions (p.141-160), pricing by online retailers i.e. price 
discrimination (p. 189), auto insurance rates (p. 164-165) and of course the targeted advertising 
that individuals see (O’Neil 2017). By facilitating tracking, libraries are contributing information 
to models of the data brokers and online advertisers who compile e-scores. What is the average 
credit score of someone who searches the library catalog from home; how does that compare 
with those who search from inside the library? Are library patrons more or less likely to 
comparison shop online for car insurance? When libraries enable third-party tracking they are 
potentially allowing for the collection of information that might be incorporated into e-score 
models attempting to answer those very questions.   
What else can libraries do to advance privacy? One compelling proposal from librarians at 
Cornell University is the abandonment of Google Analytics (Chandler and Wallace 2016). If 
Google Analytics is not abandoned entirely, libraries should configure it to maximally preserve 
such privacy as can be retained by: forcing a secure connection between the library website and 
Google’s servers, implementing the Google Analytics IP Anonymization (aka IP-masking) 
feature, and following Google’s best practices (O’Brien et al. 2018; Google n.d.). Libraries need 
pageview data in order to streamline and justify digital operations but there is no reason that 
libraries need to use the popular commercial product which by its own admission says personally 
identifiable information “is often inadvertently sent in these URLs” when functional alternatives 
exist (Google n.d.).  
On the computers available for public use in-house, libraries could set an example of how to use 
the internet in a more secure and private way by defaulting their web search to a more private 
option such as DuckDuckGo (Ard 2016; Clark 2016). Along these lines, libraries should 
“harden” the browsers on those computers and block advertising and third-party tracking as 
numerous authors have suggested and provide clear documentation about why these measures 
have been taken (Phetteplace 2012; Gardner 2013; Gardner and Groover 2015; Clark 2016; Ayre 
2017). To be specific, browsers should have the following add-ons/extensions installed: HTTPS 
Everywhere, one of either Privacy Badger, Disconnect, or Ghostery, and an ad-blocker such as 
uBlock or AdBlockPlus.11 The presence of such software on public access computers should be 
supplemented with period public outreach and education, encouraging library patrons who wish 
to retain some degree of privacy outside of the library to install them on their own private 
devices (Ard 2016). One simple strategy would be to bundle such education into the existing 
Choose Privacy Week of the American Library Association, which already provides brief 
descriptions of the aforementioned tools and services in the paragraph as well as sample 
curricula (American Library Association n.d.; n.d.).  
 
11 The relative merits of each of these are beyond the scope of this paper.  




Regarding the disclosure of tracking, Rebecca Miller has said it best: “We must inform people of 
what their daily options represent for their privacy in more meaningful language than a 
boilerplate click-thru agreement.” (Miller 2014) Yet at least as of 2017, 58% of libraries in the 
sample were failing to meet that standard. There is debate in the profession about the amount of 
data retention and tracking that needs to take place in order to maintain and improve virtual 
library services; with some arguing for a more “nuanced” approach (read: one in favor of 
collecting more granular data about individuals) (Varnum 2015).  Yet even those individuals and 
organizations in favor of more tracking and data collection agree that tracking on library 
websites must take place with informed consent and the ability to opt-out (National Information 
Standards Organization 2015). The fact that so many libraries fail to make their privacy policies 
easily accessible should lead at least to some thoughtful self-reflection on the part of institutions 
and the individuals tasked with website design and maintenance; ideally, it would lead to 
possible public admonishment and concomitant behavior change.  
As noted above, libraries which allow third-party tracking on their websites and which also fail 
to make their privacy policies discoverable and intelligible are in prima-facie breach of Principle 
III of the ALA Code of Ethics. The commercial vendors are not under the same legal or moral 
obligations as their customers.  Ancestry, Consumer Reports, and Lynda were particularly 
egregious enablers of third-party tracking according to the Disconnect extension, see Table 2 
above. If librarians are dissatisfied with that state of affairs, they could bring public pressure to 
bear on those vendors to change their practices or cease purchasing those products altogether. At 
minimum, libraries should be encouraging awareness of the fact that when patrons leave the 
confines of the library’s website, even for services the library purchases and promotes, they are 
subject to less stringent privacy regimes. After their ordeal with the civil grand jury, Santa Cruz 
Public Libraries have been a model of this behavior and developed a privacy policy page listing 
each of their commercial databases, the data kept by each vendor, and whether the library can see 
patrons’ personally identifiable information (Santa Cruz Public Libraries n.d.).  
The question of HTTPS usage is a simple one: all pages under a library’s control should be 
served securely using HTTPS by default. Admirable work on securing websites has been 
underway for a few years now in the form of the Let’s Encrypt initiative of the Internet Security 
Research Group which is endorsed by big Silicon Valley firms. There is every reason to believe 
that the snapshot picture captured in time in this study (and others) has improved recently 
(O’Brien et al. 2018; Hellman, Eric 2016; Breeding 2016). But we as a profession should not be 
too quick to pat ourselves on the back considering that offering a secure connection is only one 
aspect of our ethical obligations in the privacy hierarchy. Furthermore, some catalogs are hosted 
by vendors and the libraries may not have direct control over the usage of TLS. Similarly, it is 
not uncommon for public libraries to have their webpage hosting taken care of by a larger 
governmental entity such as a city or county. In these circumstances, we should not rush to 
condemn them, as there are larger bureaucratic forces that may be impeding the deployment of 
HTTPS.  
Larger institutions may also have control of the type of web analytics that a library uses on their 
website. In particular, Google Analytics is the de facto industry standard and commonplace on 
city government and university websites, including their library sub-directories, a fact that 
librarians use to their advantage for research and evaluative purposes (Vecchione et al. 2016; 




Hess 2012). Ultimately, given the fact that HTTPS was formally specified in the year 2000 and 
yet in 2017 47% of Canadian libraries and 67% of United States libraries sampled still failed to 
default to HTTPS on their website and their OPAC (see: Table 4) suggests that much work 
remains to be done (“HTTPS” 2020).    
Limitations 
 There are several limitations that apply to this study and its results. First, the sample 
population of public libraries in the Canadian Urban Libraries Council and Urban Libraries 
Council is adequate to generate conclusions about the types of tracking that goes on for users of 
public libraries in urban areas within Canada and the USA. In principle, all the issues raised 
regarding tracking and usage of HTTPS apply to rural libraries as well. It is possible that rural 
populations are even more dependent upon libraries for internet access. Because of lower 
population density, rural populations may even be more susceptible to targeted third-part tracking 
when using a library website or catalog from their own home or smartphone. However, because 
they are out-of-sample, no conclusions should be drawn about the level of tracking that rural 
libraries are enabling. Similarly, no one should generalize these results to the European Union 
context, which has more stringent privacy regulations for third parties (Linden et al. 2020). A 
second limitation is what constitutes “tracking” by third parties. There is ongoing debate regarding 
the mechanisms of tracking and the type and amount of data that is collected. Some of this debate 
is manifest in the way that Ghostery and Disconnect (or other similar web browser plugins such 
as EFF’s Privacy Badger) come up with different tracker counts. Rather than wade into the 
definition morass, this methodology takes the different definitions and approaches given and 
reports both results.  
Notably, the measure of tracking disclosure is crude. Some libraries may disclose tracking 
in depth but have the information buried several clicks into their website. These institutions would 
fail the measure. Other libraries may have a link to a privacy policy or terms of use on the landing 
page, but it may not accurately disclose the extent of third-party tracking that is happening. Since 
the accuracy of each library’s privacy policy or terms was not verified and only the mere presence 
of such a document was recorded, these institutions would pass the measure.12 Best practices are 
that every library should make their privacy policy and/or terms of use easily available from the 
landing webpage in order to allow visitors to examine that information as soon as possible should 
they be interested in doing so (American Library Association Office for Intellectual Freedom 
2014). It is left to the reader to judge their risks and potential payoffs. Another important limitation 
of the disclosure data is that this study was conducted prior to the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation coming widely into effect. In compliance with those rules, it is now 
commonplace for users on commercial websites to be presented with web cookie or other tracking 
notification (Sørensen and Kosta 2019). Since users are in the process of being habituated to 
clicking through these notices at commercial websites, perhaps libraries may need to adjust their 
approach.  
 
12 Readers interested in pursuing this research question are urged to consult Gallagher, McMenemy, and Poulter who 
studied acceptable use policies with an innovative methodology (Gallagher, McMenemy, and Poulter 2015). While 
the privacy policies of vendors are beyond this paper, there is evidence that they fail to meet the expectations of 
librarians (Lambert, Parker, and Bashir 2015). 




One final limitation of importance pertains to the audit of HTTPS usage on library websites 
and online public access catalogs. When those data were recorded in 2017 the Let’s Encrypt 
certificate authority had launched the previous year and was gaining momentum. Let’s Encrypt 
provides free TLS/SSL certificates in an automated user-friendly way and at time of writing has 
been instrumental in bringing security to over 100 million website domains (Let’s Encrypt n.d.). 
It is very likely that some OPAC vendors, local governments, or individual public libraries 
themselves took advantage of Let’s Encrypt’s services to secure their sites since data collection. 
Additionally, dramatic data breaches and hacks, which have received widespread media coverage 
since 2017, have increased public and governmental awareness of website security and privacy 
issues.   
Further Research 
 The data presented above is a static snapshot. But the internet, and the third-party tracker 
ecosystem, is continually evolving. One clear opportunity for further research would be to follow 
the incidence of third-party tracking longitudinally. A better picture of the user base affected would 
be captured by also studying libraries that serve rural populations. Additionally, qualitative 
research should be done on the accuracy of library privacy policies and terms of use. We still do 
not know how many libraries disclose the number of third-party trackers their users are subjected 
to or the accuracy of these disclosures. Do they explicitly list the firms that developed these 
trackers and what the firms claim to be able to legally do with the information they collect? 
Furthermore, what benefits do libraries derive from including third-party trackers on their websites 
and catalogs? Web traffic analytics are certainly useful in library administration, but it is possible 
to collect, store, and analyze these in-house using tools such as Matomo or Open Web Analytics. 
Some added benefit must be derived from relying on a commercial tool like Google Analytics, 
perhaps the ease of use and lack of subscription or hosting costs is why so many libraries have 
adopted it. Moving beyond traffic statistics, why are libraries allowing any other third-parties to 
track their users? Presumably, they gain operational benefits from this sacrifice of patron privacy. 
But we do not know their explicit motivations or whether libraries are even aware of the fact that 
the gains from third-party tracking explicitly force a reduction in privacy.  More research into the 
tradeoffs of privacy for other benefits, and the motivations of the librarians who accept these 
tradeoffs, is required. 
Conclusion    
The results of this study, in concert with other recent evidence reviewed above 
demonstrate that many public libraries in Canada and the United States are not doing all that they 
can to protect the privacy of their patrons in digital environments that they ostensibly control. 
Librarians are marching in a compact group along a precipitous and difficult path, in which our 
strongest allies are each other. We are surrounded on most sides by vendors who, given the 
opportunity, would place our users under their almost constant surveillance. While many 
libraries may have bureaucratic impediments to offering their patrons a secure and private (with 
respect to third-parties) online experience, others are not blameless. Libraries must take active 
steps to secure their websites and catalogs using TLS/SSL. If libraries believe that third-party 
tracking provides more benefits to their operations than the cost incurred in loss of privacy, this 
must be disclosed to their users. If libraries opt to allow third-party tracking, their on-site 




computers should allow the option of viewing the website and querying the catalog using a 
browser that is configured to block all such tracking. Anything less than these measures is a 
failure to live up to the relevant clauses of the ALA Code of Ethics and a betrayal of user trust. It 
is particularly necessary to arouse in all who participate in the practical work of library website 
maintenance discontent with the status quo prevailing among librarians and an unshakable 
determination to rid ourselves of it. Hopefully this research will raise awareness about the level 
of security and privacy that Canadian and American urban library patrons are afforded and spur 
action.  
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Reliability of Tracking Counts  
Despite the fact that both Ghostery and Disconnect purport to use the same general methods 
of detecting third-party trackers, i.e. examining JavaScript elements in a loaded web page, there 
were occasionally discrepancies between their results. Previous research on ad-blocking software 
has noted differences between the two add-ons with regard to their handling of third-party tracking 
and advertising. Doruk Uzunoglu examined the filter lists these various ad-blockers rely on to 
determine if a tag or script is benign or somehow involved in tracking or advertising. Uzunoglu 
outlined six categories of domains listed on popular filter lists: AdTrackers, Analytics, Beacons, 
Other Third-Parties, Social, and Widgets; the results showed that the default Ghostery settings 
consistently block either more than or the same amount of domains compared to the default 
Disconnect settings (Uzunoglu 2016).       
Our analysis found that more often than not, Ghostery and Disconnect recorded the same 
results when loading the same URLs. The same total number of third-party trackers results were 
obtained by both add-ons for 60.1% of URLs examined in this study. Disconnect recorded more 
trackers 32.45% of the time; Ghostery recorded more for the remaining 7.45%. When differences 
between the Ghostery and Disconnect counts were noted, more often than not they were small. For 
75 sample members, there were discrepancies between the two tracker counts, in 63 of those 
instances (84%), the difference was 2 or less. There were, however, some extreme outlier cases: 
Figure A1 displays the frequency of each discrepancy count between the trackers. Due to the 
aforementioned discrepancies, counts for both trackers are reported separately in the results rather 
than calculating a composite tracker count.   
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